At the Fourth Archiepiscopal Synod of the Ukrainian Catholic Bishops convened in Rome, September 29- October 1969», it was unanimously agreed by Major-Archbishop Joseph Slipyj and the other 20 bishop members that a petition be sent to Pope Paul VI to establish a patriarchate for the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Nearly two years later, on July 7, 1971 Metropolitan Slipyj received the Pope’s answer. It was No!
The contents of the letter can easily and briefly be summarized: the Pope tells of the verdict reached by the small commission of cardinals that he appointed to examine Metropolitan Slipyj’s reasons for establishing a patriarchate. The inopportuneness of erecting such a Ukrainian patriarchate at the present time stemmed from canonical, historical, spiritual, and pastoral considerations. Then the Pope proceeds to develop only one of these reasons: the canonical ruling that prevents patriarchs and major-archbishops from exercising rights outside of their own territory.
One cannot help but be moved by a certain sympathy and compassion towards the Pontiff in reading his letter. Like Hamlet, he appears torn dramatically in two directions. He tells us of his great love for the Ukrainian people; his admiration for their sufferings for the faith over centuries; and his personal esteem towards Metropolitan Slipyj. He goes so far as to assure the Metropolitan that his «own mind was most inclined to accept your petitions.» This would imply that the Pope personally wished to establish the Ukrainian Patriarchate. But stronger reasons than his own personal convictions changed his mind: «Having seriously weighed before the Lord the opinions of the Cardinal Fathers. We have come with difficulty once again to the conclusion that it is impossible, at least at this time, to establish a Ukrainian patriarchate.»
Though stated that important contemporary canonical, historical, spiritual, and pastoral reasons dictated this most recent refusal, yet the sole reason adduced in the letter touches on canonical discipline. The essence of his argument is that the canon law binding upon Eastern Catholic Churches today limits the jurisdiction of patriarchs to within the boundaries of their own territory.
If such a patriarchate were to be established by the Holy See, the Pope argues, the Major-Archbishop and his synod would have jurisdiction only within the historical boundaries of his metropolia of Lviv. But due to Soviet domination of that region, his presence there and any such exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction within this territory are at present out of the question.
The Pope points out that if the Ukrainian Patriarch could not exercise his jurisdiction within his own territory, but wished to exercise his patriarchal rights outside of his own territory, he would be asking for powers that no other Catholic patriarch now enjoys. The Pope poses the clinching argument in the form of a question: «Who could prevent other patriarchs from seeking to enjoy the same faculty of extending their own competency beyond the limits of the territory and the prescriptions of canonical laws by which their authority is at present defined?»
His final argument skirts what is apparently the major consideration in the mind of Cardinal Villot and the «small commission of Cardinal Fathers. The Pope turns with great feeling towards the suffering Ukrainians in the USSR «who have been forced to silence thus far for fidelity to their own Faith.» He suggests that their suffering would increase if a patriarchate were granted to them. One cannot help but ask the sardonic question: «When the Ukrainian Catholics in the Ukraine have for over 25 years suffered all imaginable persecutions, even including the complete disolution of their Church, is there any more suffering possible for them to endure?» As one reads this section of the Pope’s letter, it is difficult not to conclude that there are two main reasons—vaguely hinted at but not explicitly mentioned—which account for the refusal to create a Ukrainian Patriarchate. That the Pope is concerned about the suffering Ukrainians in the USSR no one can doubt. But it cannot be denied that Vatican politics with Moscow play a greater role in formulating the answer given to Metropolitan Slipyj than the canonical reason provided.
Why did the Pope ask Metropolitan Slipyj to send a new report giving all the arguments that he and his bishops felt warranted a patriarchate to Jean Cardinal Villot, the Vatican’s Secretary of State? Villot is also, as the Pope mentions in the letter, the Prefect of the Council for the Public Affairs of the Church. Canon 202 of Cleri Sanctitati (the Eastern Catholic canon law on Persons, promulgated on June 11, 1957 describes this Council as the agency that deals with setting up new divisions of church order when these would touch the affairs of civil governments. «Especially does this Congregation have responsibility for those affairs which fall under its competence by the Supreme Pontiff through the Cardinal Secretary of State in a special manner for those which touch civil laws and refer to pacts entered upon with nations.»
Anyone can see that the question of a Ukrainian patriarchate touches upon the Vatican rapprochement that the Pope’s ambassador to the Iron Curtain countries, Archbishop Agostino Casaroli, has been pursuing within the past few years. When Jan Cardinal Willebrands, head of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity, represented the Pope at the enthronization of Patriarch Pimen of the Russian Orthodox Church in June, 1971, the newly-elected head of that Church chose that occasion to joyfully reiterate the announcement of the complete liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, or rather, as the Patriarch put it, «the triumphal return into the Orthodox Church in 1946 of the Uniates who had been forced into union with Rome at the Union of Brest, 1596.» Not a word of protest was registered then or afterwards by Cardinal Willibrands or Cardinal Villot. (This silence on Rome’s part about the violent destruction of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is clearly a matter of policy. With her great sensitivity for history and protocol, the Vatican’s official publications studiously took no note, made no mention of the sorrowful 25th anniversary of the psuedo-Council of 1946 which marked the end—for Moscow’s purposes—of the Ukrainian Catholic Church). Rome seems to be playing the perennial game of politics. To gain some concessions, especially for the Latin Catholics in Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, and Russia, the Ukrainian Catholic Church must not bе allowed to take on new life. The Soviet authorities fear any native, popular movement, especially when it is deeply religious and bound in its allegiance to a center outside the USSR ! like the Vatican.
The more impelling (although not explicitly stated) reason for refusing the patriarchate is the fear on the part of the Roman Curia of what would happen in predominately Roman Catholic countries if a Ukrainian or Melkite patriarch and his synod were to have jurisdiction outside of the home territory, embracing his faithful wherever they might reside. The Pope registers his alarm in these words: «Furthermore, the problems which could arise within the Catholic Church Itself may be easily foreseen if such patriarchal jurisdiction, detrimental to other existing canonical jurisdictions, were to be recognized in those territories.»
For years there have lived in Poland 300,000 Ukrainian Catholics («Ukrainskyj katolycyzm u sviti.» Visti z Rymu. Rome, May 20, 1970, p. 12.) without a bishop of their own rite. Cardinal Wyszynski has bitterly opposed any Catholic ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Polish territories other than that given to him and his Polish Latin rite bishops. The pressure exerted in the U.S.A. and Canada by American bishops and Rome itself to retain as long as pоssible the Eastern-rite Catholic inferior jurisdictions (called exarchates or eparchies) answerable directly to Rome, are well known to all Utter uniformity of church discipline, liturgy, and practice creates a situation with few problems. To be sure if the Church took seriously the solemn declaration of 2,600 bishops in an Ecumenical Council that all rites in the Church are of equal dignity, this would make for many changes in curial circles. But unless the following words were meaningless, a revolution was in fact launched by Vatican II: «For this reason [this Council] solemnly declares that the Churches of the East…fully enjoy the right and are in duty bound to rule themselves. Each should do so according to its proper and individual procedures…» (No. 5 of the Decree on the Easten Churches.)
The Pope clearly saw that granting a patriarchate to the Ukrainian Church would displease the Soviet authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church dignitaries. It does not make much sense to have a patriarch who can not rule within his own patriarchate. But would a newly appointed patriarch (whoever he might be) ignore the million and a half Ukrainian Catholics living throughout the rest of the world? Or did Rome really think Eastern Catholics were of the same dignity as Roman rite Catholics and hence had the right to be ruled by their own bishops irrespective of preferences show by the majority of Roman Catholics and the stranglehold now exercised by the Congregation for the Eastern Churches? Can one imagine, for example, what would happen in America if Eastern bishops could ordain married men according to their ancient custom of a married clergy? No, a Ukrainian patriarchate is simply out of the question. It would cause too many problems for other «duly constituted jurisdictions»—that is, the Roman Rite !
And so the whole affair is dismissed, by a Roman tour de force. The canon law binding upon Eastern Catholics since Cleri Sanctitati and the latest interpretation of March 25, 1970 (the Declaration, «Apostolica Sedes declares that no patriarch and his synod can exercise any jurisdiction outside his territory. The Pope entreats Metropolitan Slipyj and his bishops and people to accept his verdict, since «it is clear by law» that Ukrainian Catholic bishops cannot, outside of the Ukraine, be under the rule of a patriarch and his synod.
For many Ukrainians the Pope’s letter will be a disappointment. They had felt confident that he would grant them a patriarchate as a necessary means to continue as a unique Eastern Church within the Catholic Church. The real issue is not whether or not to have a Ukrainian patriarchate. The real issue is to bring the Ukrainian Catholic Church to awareness of the autonomy that is theirs already. There is no question here of the Pope granting anything. Rights to rule their Church autonomously have been enjoyed by the Ukrainian major-archbishops and their bishops in synod from the days of the Metropolia of Kiev—then of Halych—and finally a recognition of the Metropolia of Lviv in 1807 to be the successor of the ancient See of Kiev-Halych. These rights were solemnly guaranteed by Rome at the Union of Brest in 1596 and reaffirmed once again by the Vatican Council II in the Decree on the Eastern Churches.
Article 7 of this Vatican II decree, like Cleri Sanctitati. recognized that a major-archbishop is equivalent to a patriarch. This means that in substance the Ukrainian Catholic Church has everything, according to its ancient rights and privileges, everything that all other Catholic patriarchal Churches, such as the Melkite, Armenian, Coptic, Maronite, have. To further remove any doubt in anyone’s mind, we have the statement from the Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Churches dated December 23, 1963 which declares that the Ukrainian Metropolitan of Lviv, Joseph Slipyj, is a major-archbishop in accordance with Cleri Sanctitati therefore equivalently a patriarch—at least in terms of his administering the Ukrainian Church.
The Pope has refused to establish a Ukrainian patriarchate. But what is, at stake is a totally different question—one which he himself and the Eastern Churchsi canon law have already answered. The Ukrainian Catholic Church, being under a major-archbishop, now possesses all the powers to rule itself as a particular Church through a type of synodal administration according to its ancient rights and privileges.
A further question and the really crucial one here is: Does an Eastern Patriarch or Major-Archbishop have jurisdiction only within his own territory? This is so important that it merits a bit of historical development.
The principle of jurisdiction limited to defined territories was established at the Ecumencial Council of Constantinople I (381) and reiterated in more specific form at the Council of Chalcedon (451). Cleri Sanctitati (Canon.240, #2) and the Decree on the Eastern Churches (no. 9) restrict the jurisdiction of patriarchs and major-archbishops to their defined territories without citing any documents to prove the authenticity for such a tradition in the Eastern Churches.
The fact is that both the Eastern patriarchs and the Western patriarci the bishop of Rome, have constantly violated this principle of territory. Tb reason is found in the Eastern Churches Canon Law itself. Cleri Sanctitati explicitly states that the principle of territory holds «unless some other reason demands otherwise from the very nature аt the case or constituted by some right, («Nisi aliud ex natura rei vel jure constet.» Can. 326, #2).
A very concrete case, an exact parallel to that of the Ukrainian Major-archiepiscopate, is found in the seventh century when in the Synod of Trullo (692) it was decreed that the Cypriotes who fled from Arab persecution ili Cyprus to take up residence near Constantinople were to be under the jurisdiction of their own Major-Archbishop and not under that of the Patriarch of Constantinople in whose territory they now lived. This may well be the first case of double jurisdiction in the same territory. But it can be multiplied by innumerable examples. How many times has the Latin Church set up its own jurisdiction in Eastern lands because their faithful had either migrated there or because Latin missionaries had made converts to the Latin rite of the native Eastern rite Christians or non-Christians The examples are clear: the extension of Latin rite jurisdiction to such Eastern lands as Palestine and the Near East during and after the Crusades, in India, side by side with the Eastern Malabar Christians, in Egypt, and in Ethiopia.
In Lviv itself there had existed for centuries three jurisdictions within the very same territory: a Ukrainian Catholic Archbishop, an Armenian Archbishop, and a Latin rite Archbishop. The question which should be asked is why does the Pope of Rome suddenly call upon the principle of territory to restrict the Ukrainian Church in its demands for autonomy to exercise jurisdiction wherever Ukrainian Catholics reside when for centuries the good of souls has dictated that this out-dated principle of territory be ignored?
To appeal solely to this principle and to forget the good of the faithful is to play legal games and to forget that the Church is the Body of Christ. Jurisdiction is given to help the faithful grow in Christ. When modern circumstances of life under Communism have created situations in which a Church of six million cannot function according to ancient rules, then the good of the faithful clearly demands that rules be changed—in fact, that they be automatically Ignored because a greater principle is at stake—the good of the faithful demands another principle.
The Holy See has already recognized that Major Archbishop Joseph Slipyj enjoys jurisdiction over his Ukrainian faithful wherever they reside. Article 18 of the decree of Vatican II on Eastern Churches prescribed a new marriage form allowing any Catholic validly to marry an Orthodox in an Orthodox Church. The Latin rite Archdiocese of Detroit asked the Holy See when this new provision obliged Ukrainian and Ruthenian Catholics in the U.S.A.: whether from January 22, 1965 when Pope Paul VI ordered the new legislation, or from April 7, 1965, the date when Major-Archbishop Joseph Slipyj decreed it to be in force for the Ukrainians. The Sacred Congregation for the Eastern Churches replied «that the Decree for the Eastern Churches began to oblige the Ruthenians of the United States on January 22, 1965. It began to oblige the Ukrainians of the United States on April 7, 1965.» This would indicate that Major-Archbishop was, by his ruling, exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Catholics wherever they reside.
Another example of the relationship between Patriarchs (including Major-Archbishops) and their bishops living outside of their limited territory was clarified in the Declaration, «Apostolica Sedes» of March 25, 1970. It was decreed that bishops may participate with deliberative vote in all patriarchal synods both for the election of a new patriarch or of new bishops or for any other synodal business. The Patriarch and the synod were to submit three candidates for bishoprics outside of the patriarchal territory. Yet a few weeks later, on April 10, 1970, Cardinal de Furstenberg communicated the decision of the Pope that the Ukrainian bishops, when they met together, did not constitute a synod but only «a conference of Ukrainian bishops.» The following spring of 1971 the Holy See clearly disregarded its own Declaration, and appointed two Ukrainian auxiliary bishops for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia without any consultation from the Major-Archbishop or his synod.
A noted Eastern canonist teaching at the Pontifical Oriental Institute, J. Rezac, S.J., argues in a recent article («His Extension of the Power of Patriarchs and of the Eastern Churches in general over the faithful of their own Rite,» in Concilium. 8/5;1969) that the jurisdiction of patriarchs and major-archbishops must be extended outside of the limits of their own territories. His basic reason is that the Mother Churches are obviously more capable of taking care of their own faithful. Such church leaders are able not only to obtain capable priests and bishops who know the traditions of their Church, but they will zealously maintain and foster their ancient rights and customs. The Church is not a legal entity but a living organism whose health must be determined by the spiritual assistance given to the individual members. Patriarchs have a moral duty to their faithful to take care of them; but this means they must enjoy jurisdiction over those faithful wherever they live. The Church has changed much and with so much intermingling of nationalities in today’s world, the personal aspect is more important in questions of jurisdiction than the principle of territory. Another reason Fr. Rezac gives flows from the principle propounded by Vatican II that insists so strongly on the observance of subsidiarity. If a lower unit, a person, or a community, can effect something with efficiency, there is no need to appeal to a higher authority. Surely a Synod of Ukrainian bishops under the Major-Archbishop is more capable of knowing and meeting the needs of their own people than the Eastern Congregation headed by a Belgian Latin rite Cardinal, whose secretary is an Italian Latin rite Archbishop. Another reason is the ecumenical dimension. If the Catholic Church is sincere about showing Orthodox, Anglican, and Protestant Christians that she respects their true ecclesial elements—and for the Orthodox the basic forra of Church administration is the patriarchal system—Rome will have to back up its high-sounding rhetoric about the respect it professes for the patriarchal form of administration by recognizing that form as viable and allowable for the Eastern Catholic Churches.
The Orthodox have found from experience that such a patriarchal system is more effectively pastoral and produces greater good when each Orthodox Patriarchal Church is allowed to extend its jurisdiction outside of its territory to wherever the faithful of their respective Churches live. If the Orthodox were to unite with Rome, would the Pope of Rome refuse the Patriarchal Orthodox Churches jurisdiction over their faithful, in America because this was outside of their patriarchal limits?
The ultimate reason that summarizes all of the foregoing is that the good of the Ukrainian faithful demands that the Ukrainian Catholic Church not be given something new to better assist its people, but that the good of the faithful demands the full recognition of what has been an integral part of the rights of the Ukrainian Church since the Union of Brest in 1596 The Roman Catholic Church has stated for decades and reaffirmed with special vigor at Vatican II that the Eastern Catholic faithful be ruled by the leader; of their respective Churches according to their ancient rights and privileges.
This is to make the Church truly Catholica allowing a richness of diverse forms of liturgical, canonical, theological, and spiritual expression flowing from the particular Churches that develop in Christlike charity and harmony with their sister-Churches, all under the loving service of the head of the Church of Rome. Then jurisdiction will be seen not as power to be jealously held on to and fought for, but an opportunity to give greater service to Christ’s flock. Only by recognizing the autonomy that the Ukrainian Catholic Church always had the right to exercise will the Ukrainian Church grow dynamically as a part of those Eastern Churches, that the Catholic bishops at the Second Vatican Council «solemnly declared… fully enjoy the right and are in duty bound to rule themselves» (no. 5). If the Ukrainian Catholic Church cannot rule itself under its Major-Archbishop and his synod of bishops but must continue to be legislated for by the Eastern Congregation, the Ukrainian Church will be extinct in a few years together with the other Eastern Catholic Churches. The Roman Church will have ceased to be Catholic and a particular Church will wrongly claim to be the universal Church founded by Christ. But history will rise up to haunt that claim.
